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i qar	NRO <del>NRO NRO NEVIEW(S) FOI RELEGE</del> 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100050039-7	
	CORONA Management 20 July 1964	25X1
25X1	Memo to DCI from ADWheelon Subj: Perspective on and the CORONA Program	
	that the effective Air Force/CIA partnership in U-2 operations that the effective Air Force/CIA partnership in U-2 operations could be carried over into space by "relying on the breadth and depth of technical and management experience available in the Air Force". Accordingly, the ten man Program 162 office was set up to control Lockheed and the payload contractors on a day-to-day basis, reserving for Bissell the monthly program decisions.	
Bulce	The initial flight program in 1959 and 1960 of 13 flights was a total shambles and everyone agreed something more needed to be done. was brought in on a clandestine basis to diagnose the flights but Lockheed would not accept them in the SETD role. Charyk then suggested that a separate them in the SETD role itself might perform the systems engineer element of Lockheed itself might perform the systems engineer Approved For Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP85B00803R000100050039-7	25X1
Att ach	ed,	

Wheelon's op@nion about AF desire to bring in bexween to perform SETD for CORONA:	25X1
I have been thoroughly convinced for the past year that CIA could do a much better job of managing the CORONA payload program. The Air Force need to bring in only convinces me of this view.	

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COR

COR-0756 Wm Burke ,AC/DPD to DDCI sub: Backgrnd 4 Feb 1960 of the DISC. Series

## PROBLEMS:

Continuing camera difficulties centered around the stresses encountered in ascent and the extreme environmental conditions on orbit. These were difficult to simulate in the laboratory and there were problems with film tearing and camera jamming. Intensive research eliminated many of the possible causes of camera and film failure and improved the confidence factor as 1960 program continued.

Recovery problems (retro-rocket failures, battery failures, loss of stabilization) also received intense analysis and an all-out effort toward improved performance.

The failures of 1959-60, while extremely costly, were valuable in adding to the knowledge of the programs managers X in this field in which they were pioneering. Some of the lessons learned in the DISCOVERER series were also applicable to, and made use of by, other satellite Approved for Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP85B00803R000100050039-7

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